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JOINT TENANCIES AND TENANCIES BY THE
ENTIRETY IN MICHIGAN-FEDERAL GIFT
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Douglas A. Kahn*
T IE establishment of joint tenancy' ownership of property, or
the termination of such a tenancy, may have federal gift tax
consequences to the co-owners of the property. Consequently, the
gift tax is a factor to be weighed before embarking on either of these
ventures. The gift tax consequences are determined by the nature of
the property rights enjoyed by the joint tenants under the control-
ling state property law, and accordingly it is desirable, where Michi-
gan property law is applicable, to consider the Michigan law and
the significance of that law to the operation of the gift tax. How-
ever, before discussing Michigan property law, it may be helpful to
review briefly the general principles controlling the applicability of
federal gift taxes to joint tenancy interests.2
I. GIFT TAXATION OF INTERESTS IN JOINT TENANCIES
The creation of a joint tenancy constitutes a gift from the party
who provided a disproportionate amount of the consideration for
the jointly held property, except, as noted below, in some instances
where real property is held jointly by a husband and wife. The value
of that gift turns upon (1) whether a joint tenant acting alone can
sever the joint tenancy as to his interest, and (2) the respective rights
of the joint tenants to share in the income from the property.3
If a donor creates a joint tenancy between himself and another
person or persons, and if the nature of the tenancy is that any joint
tenant, without the consent of the other tenants, may terminate the
survivorship rights of the other tenants in his interest, then the value
of the gift is determined in the same manner as where the joint
0 Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1955, North Carolina;
J.D. 1958, George Washington-Ed.
1. As used herein, the term "joint tenancy" refers to a co-ownership of property
where the interest of a co-owner passes upon his death to the surviving co-owner or
co-owners by operation of law. The term does not, therefore, include tenancies in
common where there are no rights of survivorship, but may encompass tenancies by
entirety.
2. For a fuller discussion of the gift tax issues concerning jointly-held property,
see PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES-GIFTS-TRuSTS 127-82 (1966) (study
outline published by the American Bar Association); C. LowND~s & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs 656-70 (2d ed. 1962).
3. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(b) (1958).
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interests in the property are held in a tenancy in common, that is,
the survivorship rights of the joint tenants are ignored in valuing
their respective interests. Thus, the value of the gift is the difference
between the total value of the consideration provided by the donor
and the value of the donor's percentage interest in the property as
a co-tenant.4
Where a donor creates a joint tenancy in property between him-
self and one or more other persons, and the survivorship rights of
the joint tenants cannot be terminated by one tenant acting without
the consent of the others, then the value of the gift is determined in
accordance with an actuarial computation based upon the respective
life expectancies of the tenants.5
The following hypothetical example illustrates the operation of
the gift tax: In 1956, John Donor was forty-five years of age, and
his wife Mary was thirty-four years of age. In 1956, John purchased
Winall, Inc., common stock for $100,000 and had the stock trans-
ferred to himself and Mary as joint tenants. Under local law, John
and Mary are entitled as joint tenants to share equally in the income
from the stock. If either John or Mary could terminate the joint
tenancy without the other's consent (for example, by selling his or
her interest or by partition), then John made a gift of $50,000 to
Mary-that is, one-half of the value of the stock, since Mary received
a one-half interest.6 However, if under local law neither John nor
Mary, acting alone, could terminate the joint tenancy, then the
valuation of their respective interests in the property must account
for the possibility that each tenant might obtain the interest of the
other by survivorship. Since Mary is younger than John and there-
fore has greater prospects of survival, her interest is more valuable
than John's. Using Table IX of Internal Revenue Service Publica-
4. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958); 25.2515-2(b)(1) (1958).
5. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1958).
6. Of course, this gift may permit a marital deduction allowance of $25,000 (INT.
Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 2523), a $3,000 exclusion [INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b)], and
a deduction of any unused lifetime exemption of donor (INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2521). In practice, these deductions and exclusions must always be considered, but
since they do not affect the questions here considered, they are not taken into account
in determining the tax consequences of hypothetical situations set forth in this article.
The value of a fractional interest in real property may be less than the product
of the fraction times the value of the property. In some circumstances, the value may
be discounted because of the depressed value of a minority fractional interest; however,
it is not likely that a discount will be granted unless the taxpayer can prove through
expert testimony that it is appropriate. Compare Estate of Campanari, 5 T.C. 488
(1945), non acquiescence, 1947-1 Cum. BuL_.. 5, with Adelaide McColgan, 10 B.T.A.
958 (1928).
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tion No. 11, "Actuarial Values for Estate and Gift Tax,"7 the actuar-
ially determined factor for computing John's interest in the stock
is .40111; therefore, the value of John's interest is $100,000 times
.40111, or $40,111, and the amount of the gift to Mary is accordingly
$59,889.
Under the laws of several states, where a husband and wife own
property as tenants by the entirety, the husband is entitled to all of
the income from the property. Where applicable, this right of the
husband must be taken into account in valuing the interest of the
husband and of his wife.8
In certain circumstances, the creation of joint interests in prop-
erty by a donor will not have any immediate gift tax consequences.
If the transfer may be revoked by the donor without the consent of
an adverse party, there is no completed gift for gift tax purposes, and
the donor does not sustain any gift tax liability." For example, the
creation of a joint bank account will not usually have any immediate
gift tax consequences because the donor will customarily have the
power to withdraw all of the funds from the account and thereby
revoke the gift.10 Similarly, if John purchases a United States Savings
Bond registered as payable to "John or Mary," there is no gift to
Mary at the time of purchase.11
Perhaps the most important exemption from gift tax liability for
creating joint interests in property is set forth in Internal Revenue
Code (Code) section 2515. Section 2515 permits a donor to elect
whether real property acquired in the names of the donor and his or
her spouse as tenants by the entirety shall be treated as a gift. For
purposes of section 2515, a joint tenancy of a husband and wife with
rights of survivorship is deemed to be a tenancy by entirety. This
election applies only to (1) real property acquired as tenants by en-
tirety after the year 1954; (2) improvements made after the year
1954 to real property held by the entirety; and (3) payments made
after the year 1954 in reduction of an indebtedness on real property
held by the entirety. It should be emphasized that this election is
not applicable to personal property held by the entirety.
Where section 2515 is applicable, a donor must take affirmative
7. The tables included in IRS Publication No. 11 are reproduced in P-H FED.
TAxEs, ESTATE 8: Gair TAxrs, 120,319.1-.19.
8. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1958). See also AcruRALr. VALUES FOR ESTATE AND
Grr TAx (IRS Publication No. 11) ch. 6, p. 27 (1959).
9. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
10. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958).
11. Id.
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action if he wishes the creation of a joint interest to be treated as a
gift. If the donor takes no action, the transfer will not be so treated.
In order to elect gift tax coverage, the donor must file a gift tax
return for the calendar year in question, and he must declare the
transfer as a gift on the return. 12
The termination of a joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety may
also have gift tax consequences. A joint tenancy or tenancy by en-
tirety is terminated when, inter alia, (1) the property so held is
sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of,13 or (2) the tenants become
tenants in common in the property. If there is an increase in indebt-
edness on the property, there is a termination of the tenancy to the
extent of the increase;' 4 however, such an increase will not cause
a termination to the extent that additions are made to the jointly
held property within a reasonable period of time after such increase.
The gift tax consequences of a termination are dependent upon
the manner of division of the property (or the division of the pro-
ceeds from the disposition thereof) among the joint tenants, and
upon whether the creation of the joint tenancy had constituted a
gift from one of the joint tenants to the others. If John created a
joint interest in property between himself and Mary, and if the
transfer were not deemed a gift for gift tax purposes, either because
the transfer was incomplete or because of the operation of Code
section 2515, then, upon termination of the joint tenancy, the prop-
erty or the proceeds therefrom should be divided between John and
Mary according to the percentage of contribution each tenant made,
and a distribution to John of an interest or amount of a lesser value
than the value of John's percentage of the property (as determined
by reference to John's percentage of contribution) will constitute a
gift of the difference by John to Mary.' 5 The computation of the
percentage of consideration provided by the tenants can become
complicated if the consideration was given at several different dates,
since in such event the appreciation in value of the property between
contribution dates must be treated as additional consideration pro-
vided by the parties according to their percentage of contribution
at the time such appreciation occurred.' 6
12. INT. RiEv. CODE oF 1954, § 2515(c).
13. In some circumstances, where a husband and wife own real estate as joint
tenants or tenants by entirety and either exchange that real estate for other realty
similarly held or sell the real estate and purchase other realty similarly held, there
may be no gift tax consequences, provided that the requisites set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2515-1(d)(2)(ii) (1958) are satisfied.
14. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i) (1958).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3 (1958).
16. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2) (1958).
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For example, if in 1958 John and his wife Mary purchased
Blackacre for $40,000, John providing $30,000 of the consideration
and Mary providing the balance, and if Blackacre were held by John
and Mary as tenants by the entirety, and if John did not elect to
treat his disproportionate contribution as a gift by filing a gift tax
return, and if in 1966 the tenants sold Blackacre for $60,000 and
divided the proceeds equally, then John will have made a gift of
$15,000 to Mary in the year 1966; that is, John provided three-
fourths of the consideration, and was therefore entitled to receive
three-fourths of the proceeds.
If John created a joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety in property
between himself and Mary (or if a third party transferred property
to John and Mary as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety), and
if the transfer were deemed a gift for gift tax purposes, then upon
termination of the joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety, each co-
owner would be entitled to receive the equivalent value of his or her
property interest, valued at the date of termination, and if John
were to receive an amount less than the value of his property inter-
est, he would be deemed to have made a gift to Mary.'7 The value of
a co-owner's property interest turns upon whether or not the co-
owner, acting alone, could terminate the tenancy as to his interest;
if so, the value of the co-owner's interest is the value of his percent-
age interest in the property without regard to survivorship rights.
But, if the co-owner were powerless to terminate the tenancy as to
his interest without the consent of the other tenants, then the value
of the co-owner's percentage interest must be determined according
to an actuarial valuation of the survivorship interests of the tenants
at the date of termination of the tenancy; whether or not the tenants
were entitled to share equally in the income from the property must
also be taken into account.
The following hypothetical example illustrates the operation of
the gift tax on the termination of a joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entirety: In 1956, John Donor was forty-five years of age, and his
wife Mary was thirty-four years of age. In 1956, John purchased
Winall, Inc. common stock in the amount of $100,000 and had the
stock transferred to himself and Mary as joint tenants. In 1966,
John and Mary sold the Winall stock for $200,000 and divided the
proceeds equally between them. Under local law, neither John nor
Mary could terminate the joint tenancy without the other's consent,
and they were entitled to share equally in the income from the
17. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(b) (1958).
January 1968]
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stock. As noted above, John made a gift of $59,899 to Mary when
the joint tenancy was created. The sale of the stock in 1966 consti-
tuted a termination of the joint tenancy. At that date, John was
fifty-five years of age and Mary was forty-four. Using the actuarial
tables provided by the Internal Revenue Service, John's factor at
the date of termination was .37258, and consequently the value of
his interest in the stock was $74,516. Since John actually received
$100,000 as his share of the proceeds of sale, Mary is deemed to have
made a gift of $25,484 to John in 1966.18
In many instances where real property is held jointly by a hus-
band and wife, a portion of the consideration paid for the property
may not be deemed a gift because of Code section 2515, and a por-
tion of the consideration may constitute a gift. In that event, sepa-
rate computations must be made.19
In sum, whether the creation or termination of a joint tenancy or
tenancy by entirety has gift tax consequences depends upon the
value of the property received by each party, and the value of the
property is in turn dependent upon whether under local law a
co-tenant unilaterally can terminate the survivorship rights in his
interest and whether the co-tenants are entitled to share proportion-
ately in the income from the property.
With this background in focus, it is appropriate to turn to
Michigan property law.
II. MICHIGAN PROPERTY LAW APPLICABLE TO JOINT TEN-
ANCIES AND TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY AND FEDERAL
GIFT TAx CONSIDERATIONS IN CREATING OR
TERMINATING SuCH TENANCIES
Joint bank accounts constitute a separate and unique subject,
and the analysis of bank accounts is not within the scope of this
article.20
A. Joint Tenancies
The estate of joint tenancy exists in Michigan21 both as to real
18. Id. Of course, if under local law only John were entitled to income from the
stock, then the valuation of their respective interests should reflect that factor also.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1958).
19. Treas. Reg. § 252515-4(c) & (d) (1958) describe the method of making that
computation.
20. For a comprehensive analysis of that subject, see Wellman, The Joint and
Survivor Account in Michigan-Progress Through Confusion, 63 Mici. L. REv. 629
(1965).
21. Mxci-. Comp. LAws § 554.43 (1948); see Rendle v. Wiemeyer, 374 Mich. 50, 43,
[Vol. 66:431
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property22 and as to personalty.23 However, the estate of joint
tenancy is not favored, and with certain specific exceptions, a deed
or devise to two or more persons which does not clearly demon-
strate the grantor's or testator's desire that the property be held in
a joint tenancy will create an estate in common.2- While Michigan
Compiled Laws section 554.44 requires that a grant or devise ex-
pressly declare that the estate is a joint tenancy in order to be
effective for that purpose, the Michigan courts have relaxed that
rule slightly and permitted the estate to be proved by other language
which clearly and convincingly demonstrates the intention of the
transferor that the estate created be a joint tenancy.25
Under Michigan law, a joint tenant can convey his interest to
a third party and thereby terminate the joint tenancy as to his
interest. The conveyance severs the interest of the assigning tenant,
and his assignee holds that interest as a tenant in common.26 Also,
any joint tenant may compel partition.27 However, where a deed or
other instrument creating a joint ownership of property expressly
provides a right of survivorship, or provides for ultimate distribu-
tion to a survivor, then the Michigan Supreme Court has held that
the survivorship rights of the co-owners cannot be terminated by
any tenant without the consent of the others. Thus, provisions such
as "joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in
common," 28 "joint tenants and not tenants in common, and to the
survivor thereof,"29 "to [A] and [B], or the survivor of them,"80 or
131 N.W.2d 45, 51 (1964); Taylor v. Taylor, 310 Mich. 541, 552, 17 N.W.2d 745, 749
(1945); Kemp v. Sutton, 233 Mich. 249, 258, 206 N.AV. 366, 369 (1925).
22. Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 152-54, 287 N.W. 411, 414-15 (1939).
23. Block v. Schmidt, 296 Mich. 610, 619, 296 N.W. 698, 701-02 (1941); Lober v.
Dorgan, 215 Mich. 62, 183 N.W. 942 (1921). The earlier dedsion of Ludwig v. Bruner,
203 Mich. 556, 169 N.W. 890 (1918), which declared that there can be no joint tenancy
in personalty, has apparently been repudiated by the Michigan Supreme Court.
24. MIcH. COMp. LAws § 554.44 (1948). See Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W.
411 (1939).
MIcH. COmp. LAws § 554.45 (1948) excludes from the above provision, deeds, or
grants to a husband and wife, or to executors, or made in trust. It also excludes
mortgages.
25. Rendlc v. Wiemeyer, 374 Mich. 30, 131 N.W.2d 45 (1964); Kemp. v. Sutton, 233
Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). But see Taylor v. Taylor, 310 Mich. 541, 17 N.W.2d
745 (1945) (holding that the use of the word "jointly" in an introductory clause of
a deed did not demonstrate that the grantor intended to create a joint tenancy).
26. Rendle v. Wiemeyer, 374 Mich. 30, 131 N.W.2d 45 (1964); Smith v. Smith, 290
Mich. 143, 155-56, 287 N.W. 411, 415-16 (1939).
27. Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939); MiCH. Comp. LAws § 631.1
(1948).
28. Mannausa v. Mannausa, 374 Mich. 6, 130 N.W.2d 900 (1964); Ballard v.
Wilson, 364 Mich. 479, 110 N.W.2d 751 (1961).
29. Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich. 215, 287 N.W. 439 (1939).
30. Rowerdink v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N.W.2d 715 (1952).
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"to them and the survivor of them '31 have been held to create rights
of survivorship that cannot be terminated by one co-owner unilater-
ally. The rationale for the Michigan court's ruling is that in such
cases the co-owners actually have "joint life estates followed by a
contingent remainder in fee to the survivor .... ,,32
Thus, under Michigan law, where the instrument creating the
joint tenancy makes no express reference to survivorship rights, a
joint tenant can unilaterally sever the joint tenancy as to his interest;
therefore, when such a joint tenancy is created or terminated, the
valuation of a joint tenant's interest for gift tax purposes is made
as if the co-owners were tenants in common: no value is attributed
to survivorship rights. However, where the instrument creating a
joint ownership of property expressly refers to survivorship, the
rights of survivorship cannot be terminated unilaterally, and the
value of a co-owner's interest must be determined actuarially in
light of the possibilities of survival. It should not affect the gift tax
consequences that the rationale for prohibiting the unilateral ter-
mination of survivorship rights is that the co-owners have a joint
tenancy only in a life estate interest and that they have alternative
contingent remainders in the balance,33 for the actuarial factors
given for measuring indestructible joint tenancies are intended to
measure precisely that quantum of interest: the co-owners have a
joint interest in income for life which must be valued, and each
co-owner also has a possibility of obtaining the property in fee if he
survives the others which also must be valued. Stating it differently,
the federal tax law looks to local Michigan law to determine the
rights, duties, powers, and liabilities of the co-owners, and the
federal law then operates on the basis of the parties' legal interests
without regard to the name or "tag" that local law employs to
describe them.34
It is unclear whether the gift of an interest in a joint tenancy
which is created under Michigan law in such manner that neither
tenant can unilaterally terminate the other's survivorship rights
will qualify for the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion. Code section
2503(b) excludes from gift tax consequences the first $3,000 of gifts
made to any one donee in one year, except that gifts of "future
31. Schulz v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N.W.2d 715 (1952).
32. Ballard v. Wilson, 364 Mich. 479, 484, 110 N.W.2d 751, 753-54 (1961).
33. Ballard v. Wilson, 364 Mich. 479, 110 N.W.2d 751 (1961).
34. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S.
78, 80-81 (1940); Union Planters Natl Bank v. United States, 361 F.2d 662, 665 (6th
Cir. 1966). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(a) (1958).
[Vol. 66:431
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interests" do not qualify for this exclusion. A "future interest" is
an interest, whether vested or contingent, that is "limited to com-
mence in use, possession or enjoyment at some future date or
time."351 A joint tenant's interest in property is not a future interest
where the joint tenant can unilaterally terminate the other tenants'
survivorship rights, because the joint tenant thereby has the power,
in himself alone, to commence the use, possession, and enjoyment
of his interest. However, where Michigan law precludes the termina-
tion of survivorship rights in a joint tenancy interest unless all the
joint tenants concur, a joint tenant will nevertheless have a present
interest in his share of the income from the property, but it is quite
possible that he possesses a future interest in his survivorship rights
in the remainder;s6 and in that event, the annual gift tax exclusion
would be limited to the value of the joint tenant's interest in the
income.37 The Michigan Supreme Court's characterization of these
special joint tenancies (tenancies in which a tenant cannot unilater-
ally terminate survivorship rights in his interest) as "joint life estates
followed by a contingent remainder in fee" 38 enhances the likelihood
that such a tenant's survivorship rights do not qualify for the ex-
clusion. In opposition to this contention, it is arguable that since
a joint tenancy is not a trust and since the joint tenants possess all
of the legal and equitable interests in the property, there is no
occasion to subdivide the property into income and remainder
interests.89 Indeed, the apparent absence of any controversy in which
35. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958).
36. A property interest of a donee may be segregated into present and future
interests, and the exclusion will be allowed only to the extent of the present interest.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(c) (1958); Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 883
(7th Cir. 1943). An interest in income for life or a life estate is a present interest
[Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1958)] and usually may be valued according to tables set
forth at Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) (1958).
37. See Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950), aft'd, 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951), and
Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405 (1941), which indicate that where a restriction
is imposed on a donee's use of property (insurance policies in those cases) so that the
donee cannot use and enjoy the property without the joint action of the donee and
other persons, the donee has been given a future interest and no annual exclusion
is allowed.
38. Ballard v. Wilson, 364 Mich. 479, 110 N.W.2d 751 (1961).
39. But see Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.
1951), in which the Tax Court held that the outright assignment of life insurance
policies to five assignees in such manner that the policies could not be surrendered
or borrowed upon without the consent of all five joint owners constituted an assign-
ment of a future interest, that the payment of premiums thereon also constituted a
gift of future interest, and consequently, that no exclusion could be allowed. The
Second Circuit affirmed. It is significant that there was no trust established in Skouras,
and the five assignees were the only owners of the life insurance policies, but
assignments and payments of premiums were nevertheless deemed gifts of future
interests.
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the government has contended that such joint tenancy interests,
or interests in an estate of entirety, fail to qualify, in whole or in
part, for a gift tax exclusion suggests that the government has not
yet sought to subdivide a co-tenant's interest for that purpose.40
However, should the Internal Revenue Service choose to raise this
issue, it could make a very strong case.
Finally, it is significant that in Lober v. Dorgan,41 the Michigan
court recognized a joint tenancy in personalty only "where it is
created by the express act of the parties." Arguably, such a "joint
tenancy" is not a true joint tenancy but is actually a joint life estate
with contingent remainders, in which event the survivorship inter-
ests would be indestructible and the gift tax valuation would be
made accordingly. 42 However, a more reasonable construction of the
court's decisions is that a true joint tenancy can be created in per-
sonalty where the parties dearly evidence their intentions to create
that estate, and consequently the gift tax valuation of joint tenancy
interests in personalty is no different from the valuation of such
interests in realty.
B. Tenancies by Entirety
Michigan statutory law provides that the only permissible estates
in real property are "estates in severalty, in joint tenancy, and in
40. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRA R, Fuvmuar ESTATE_ AND GiFr TAXES (2d. ed.) 707
n.29. In Estate of Buder, 25 T.C. 1012 (1956), the Tax Court held that a gift of bonds
by a third party to a husband and wife as tenants by entirety under Missouri law
constituted a gift to each tenant to the extent of his or her interest and since earlier
in the year the donor had exhausted his annual exclusions for gifts to the spouses
by making gifts to them in excess of $3,000, no additional exclusion could be allowed
for the gift of the bonds. Thus, the Buder decision implies, but does not hold, that
the creation of a tenancy by entirety may constitute a gift which can qualify for the
annual exclusion, but it appears that the government never contended otherwise in
that case.
41. 215 Mich. 62, 67, 183 N.V. 942, 944 (1921).
42. In several states which do not recognize the estate of joint tenancy the courts
have construed a deed or grant of title in the names of two parties as "joint tenants
with rights of survivorship" as a contractual arrangement under which each party
has a joint life estate and a remainder interest contingent on surviving the other
party. E.g., Bernhard v. Bernhard, 278 Ala. 240, 177 S.2d 565 (1965). However, those
cases require that the parties clearly evidence their intention that there be rights of
survivorship in the joint owners. E.g., Teacher v. Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197
(1950); Equitable Loan & Sec. Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S.E. 320 (1903). While it
could be argued that in granting survivorship rights to personal property, the
Michigan courts were merely enforcing the necessary implication in the words "joint
tenancy" that the parties intended that the survivor take the property, it is more
likely that the basis of the courts' decisions is that there is a presumption in Mich-
igan against the estate of joint tenancy, but where the title to the property clearly
evidences a desire to establish that estate, the property will be so held.
[Vol. 66:431
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common."43 In Dowling v. Salliotte,44 the Michigan Supreme Court
declared that the above-mentioned statutory law abolished the estate
of entirety. However, within the same year, the Michigan Supreme
Court repudiated the statement made in Dowling by holding that the
estate of entirety does exist in Michigan; 45 and one year later, the
court expressly overruled the Dowling decision.46 Since that date,
the courts have uniformly sustained the existence of the estate of
tenancy by entirety in Michigan at least as to real property.47 The
rationale for sustaining the existence of the tenancy by entirety in
Michigan is that an estate of entirety is merely a special form of joint
tenancy and is therefore included in the statutory provision enabling
the creation of the latter tenancy.48
It is noteworthy that while with certain exceptions a conveyance
to two or more persons will not create a joint tenancy unless it is
clearly indicated,49 a conveyance to a husband and wife will create a
tenancy by entirety unless a contrary intent is clearly demonstrated. 50
Indeed, this presumption is so great that a conveyance to a husband
and wife as "joint tenants" was held to have created a tenancy by
entirety.51
It is clear that the estate of tenancy by entirety also exists for
certain kinds of personal property, but it is not resolved as to
whether the estate exists for all personalty.5 2
While Michigan Compiled Laws section 554.43 establishes the
estate of joint tenancy for real property (and this has been construed
to include tenancies by entirety), there is no comparable provision
for personal property. However, as noted above, the Michigan courts
have recognized that personal property can be held in joint tenancy,
and there is no apparent reason why the estate of entirety should not
43. MicH. CoMP. LAw: § 554.43 (1948). See also Micfr. Comp. LAWS § 555.42 (1948).
44. Dowling v. Salliotte, 83 Mich. 131, 47 N.W. 225 (1890).
45. Auditor General v. Fisher, 84 Mich. 128, 47 N.W. 574 (1890).
46. In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, 48 N.V. 580 (1891).
47. DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1964); Budwit v. Herr, 339
Mich. 265, 272-73, 63 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1954); Hoyt v. Winstanley, 221 Mich. 515, 191
N.W. 213 (1922).
48. Id.
49. MicH. CoMP. LAws § 554.44 (1948).
50. Guldager v. United States, 204 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1953); Hoyt v. Winstanley,
221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W. 213 (1922); In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, 48 N.W. 580 (1891).
See MicH. COMP. LAws § 554.45 (1948).
51. DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1964); Hoyt v. Winstanley,
221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W. 213 (1922). See also Dutcher v. Van Duine, 242 Mich. 477, 219
N.W. 651 (1928) (where the words "jointly and not as tenants in common" did not
preclude the creation of an estate of entirety).
52. See Bienefeld, Creditors v. Tenancies by the Entirety, 1 WAYNE L. REv. 105,
108-10 (1955).
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also be available. At common law, there was no tenancy by entirety
in personalty because the husband was deemed to own all of his
wife's chattels, and thus there was no occasion for any form of joint
ownership; however, with the enactment of a Married Women's Act
permitting a wife to own property separately, the estate of entirety
should be made applicable to personalty as well.53
In Wait v. Bovee,54 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
estate of entirety did not exist in personal property because to
permit that estate would contravene the legislative purposes of the
Married Women's Act.55 The dubious reasoning of the Wait
decision was repudiated in numerous subsequent decisions sustain-
ing the existence of the estate of entirety as to real property,5 6 and by
several decisions holding that the Married Women's Act had no
application to the estate of entirety. 7 The Wait decision further
suggested that there could be no survivorship rights between parties
except where expressly allowed by law, which presumably would
preclude a joint tenancy in personalty as well as an estate of entirety,
and while there was some initial acceptance of that view, 8 it was
ultimately settled that a joint tenancy can be created in personal
property.5 9
The Michigan Supreme Court reiterated on at least one occasion
that, with certain exceptions, the estate of entirety does not exist
in personal property,60 and the court has relied on the distinction
between personalty and realty to distinguish the Wait case.6 ' In
contradiction to those opinions, the court held in a decision some
fifty-five years after Wait that a husband and wife could hold goods
and chattels by the entirety if they so intended and agreed.6
Thus, the question of the general application of the estate of
entirety to personal property is in doubt. However, notwithstanding
53. 2 AmmucAN LAW oF PROPERTY § 6.6, at 80 (Casner ed. 1952).
54. 35 Mich. 425 (1877).
55. Mica. ComP. LAws § 557.1-.5 (1948).
56. Cases dted note 47 supra.
57. Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112, 101 N.W. 209 (1904); see Schram v. Burt,
111 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 1940).
58. Ludwig v. Bruner, 203 Mich. 556, 169 N.W. 890 (1918).
59. Block v. Schmidt, 296 Mich. 610, 619, 296 N.W. 698, 701-02 (1941); Lober v.
Dorgan, 215 Mich. 62, 183 N.W. 942 (1921).
60. Scholten v. Scholten, 238 Mich. 679, 214 N.W. 320 (1927). However, the court
in Scholten nevertheless held that the property in question passed to the surviving
spouse by survivorship.
61. In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 840, 48 N.W. 580 (1891).
62. Frank v. Patton, 251 Mich. 557, 232 N.W. 211 (1930). The personalty involved
in Patton included furniture and a lease; the court refused to hold that they were
held by the entirety because of insufficient proof of the parties' intention.
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what the general rule may be, there can be no doubt that there are
certain classes of personal property which may be held by the
entirety. Where a husband and wife sell land held by the entirety,
the proceeds of sale and any mortgages or notes taken as payment
shall be held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.6
Also, Michigan Compiled Laws section 557.151 provides that all
"bonds, certificates of stock, mortgages, promissory notes, deben-
tures, or other evidences of indebtedness" made payable to a
husband and wife shall be held by them as joint tenants (unless a
contrary intent is shown) in the same manner as they hold real
estate.0 4 Relying on that statute, the Michigan Supreme Court has
held that a conveyance to a husband and wife of personal property
of a type listed in section 557.151 creates a tenancy by entirety in the
property unless the conveyance explicitly indicates that some other
estate is intended. 65 Indeed, even use of the words "joint tenancy"
in the conveyance is not sufficient to avoid the estate of entirety;
if the parties do not wish to hold by the entirety, they must go so far
as to include in the conveyance words such as "not as tenants by the
entirety."60 Thus, as to some highly important classes of personal
property (for example, stocks, bonds, and evidences of debt), not only
does an estate of entirety exist, but indeed it requires some effort
for a husband and wife to avoid holding such properties by the
entirety where they acquire them in joint ownership. Because the
provisions of Code section 2515 are applicable only to tenancies in
real property, the existence of an estate of entirety in personal prop-
erty has far greater gift tax significance than does the existence of
that estate in realty.
The interest of a spouse in an estate of entirety cannot be
conveyed to a third party unless both tenants joint in the convey-
ance, nor can one tenant cause a partition of the property.67 More-
over, a creditor of either the husband or wife alone cannot levy
against the property or the income from the property.68 A tenant
63. Muskegon Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Johnson, 338 Mich. 655, 62 N.W.2d 619
(1954); Lappo v. Negus, 562 Mich. 242, 106 N.W.2d 765 (1961). MicH. Corm. LAws
j 557.81 (1948).
64. Micir. Com'. LAws § 557.151 (1948).
65. DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 180 N.W.2d 38 (1964).
66. Id.
67. Hearns v. Hearns, 855 Mich. 423, 53 N.W.2d 315 (1952); Schultz v. Silver, 325
Mich, 454, 35 N.W.2d 885 (1949); Berman v. State Land Office Board, 808 Mich. 143,
13 N.W.2d 238 (1944); Jacobs v. Miller, 50 Mich. 119, 15 N.W. 42 (1883).
68. See, e.g., American State Trust Co. v. Rosenthal, 255 Mich. 157, 257 N.W. 584
(1931).
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by the entirety can sever the tenancy by conveying his interest to
his or her spouse.6 9 The tenancy is also severed by a divorce of the
tenants.
7 0
Thus, the valuation of an interest in a Michigan tenancy by
entirety for gift tax purposes must include an allowance for the
possibilities of survival, since the rights of survivorship of the ten-
ants cannot be defeated by one tenant alone.71 It is true that one
spouse can terminate the tenancy by conveying his or her interest to
the other tenant, but even that action is not truly unilateral, since
the other tenant must accept the conveyance; and in any event, there
is no justification for disregarding survivorship rights merely
because H can give his co-tenant spouse, W, his interest in the
property, thus causing W to own both life interests and both re-
mainders, and thereby make W's survival unnecessary. Similarly,
the availability of divorce is not within the sole control of one spouse
and does not affect the gift tax valuation.
Before a gift tax valuation of a tenancy by the entirety can be
made, it must be determined whether the tenants are entitled to
share equally in the income from the property.7 2 Regrettably, where
a tenancy by entirety is created under Michigan law, the determina-
tion of that question for gift tax purposes is unclear. Moreover, the
adoption of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 has further com-
plicated the issue.
Under the common-law rule, a husband was entitled to the full
use of all of the property held with his wife by the entirety and there-
fore was entitled to all of the income from such property.73 However,
in 1855, Michigan enacted the Married Women's Act which pro-
vided in section 1:
That the real and personal estate of every female, acquired before
marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she may
69. Hearns v. Hearns, 833 Mich. 423, 53 N.W.2d 315 (1952); MIen. Comp. LAws
557.101 (1948).
70. MiCH. CoMp. LAws § 552.102 (1948). By its terms, this section applies to real
property, but it is likely that its provisions-which were intended to provide for the
disposition of property that was omitted from the award of a court in a divorce pro-
ceeding [Witschi v. Witschi, 261 Mich. 334, 246 N.W. 139 (1933)] and which could not
be held by the entirety after a divorce-also apply to personalty held by the entireties.
Moreover, this section was merely declaratory of existing law. Allen v. Allen, 196
Mich. 292, 162 N.W. 987 (1917).
71. It should be noted that the co-interest of the donee spouse will qualify for
the marital deduction for gift tax purposes, even though the donee spouse's co-interest
constitutes a terminable interest. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2523(d).
72. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1958).
73. 2 AmaucAN LAw oF PaoPmERY § 6.6, at 27-28 (Casner ed. 1952).
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afterwards become entitled by gift, grant, inheritance, devise,
or in any other manner, shall be and remain the estate and property
of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations and
engagements of her husband and may be contracted, sold, trans-
ferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her in the
same manner and with the like effect as if she were unmarried.74
The above-quoted section 1 is very similar to section 5 of article
XVI of the Michigan Constitution of 1850, which provision was
carried forward as section 8 of article XVI of the 1908 Constitution.
In Morrill v. Morrill,75 the Michigan Supreme Court considered the
effect of the Married Women's Act on the husband's common-law
right to all of the income from property held by the entirety. While
the court did not discuess section 5 of article XVI of the 1850
Constitution, since the language of the relevant section of the
Married Women's Act was essentially the same as that of the consti-
tutional provision, the reasoning of the court is equally applicable
to the question of the effect of the constitution on the husband's
common-law right. The court noted that in two sister states, New
Jersey and New York, the courts had held that the husband's right
to all of the use of and income from property held by the entirety
was terminated when those states adopted a Married Women's Act.7 6
The New York Court of Appeals had stressed in Hiles v. Fisher77
that if the husband's right to the use of the property were an incident
of the tenancy by entirety, that is if it were "one of its specific and
essential characteristics," it would be difficult to deem it terminated
by the Married Women's Act; but the New York court then held
that the husband's right to the use of the property was not an inci-
dent of the tenancy, but rather was the product of the husband's
common-law marital rights which operated on all property held
by the wife and which right was terminated by the Married
Women's Act. In Morrill, the Michigan court rejected the position
taken by the New Jersey and New York courts and held that under
Michigan law the husband continued to enjoy the right to use all
of the property held by the entirety.78 The court expressly declined
74. MicHr. CaMp. LAws § 557.1 (1948).
75. 138 Mich. 112, 101 N.W. 209 (1904).
76. Buttlar v. Rosenbluth, 42 N.J. Eq. 651, 9 A. 695 (Ct. Err. & App. 1887); Hiles
v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895).
77. 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895).
78. Michigan is a minority jurisdiction in its law on this issue, but it is not alone.
For example, Massachusetts and North Carolina also provide that the husband is
entitled to all of the income from property held by the entirety. Pineo v. White, 320
Mass. 487, 70 N.E.2d 294 (1946); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924).
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to decide in Morrill whether the husband's right to the income and
use of the property was an incident of the tenancy or an incident of
his marital rights, because the court determined that in either
event the right was not terminated by the Married Women's Act,
which the court held did not affect the estate of entirety or the
marital unity. However, nine years after the Morrill decision, the
Michigan Supreme Court again considered this issue in Way v.
Root,79 and there determined that the rationale for granting the
husband the income from the property was that his right was an
attribute of the tenancy, and that this form of ownership was
adopted in Michigan with all of its common-law incidents. In Way
v. Root, the court said:
The rights of husband and wife in such an estate [a tenancy by
entirety] are purely common law rights, to be tested and interpreted
by the rules of that law as they existed before the wife was emanci-
pated as to her individual property interests. By the common law
the husband controlled his wife's estate, and had the usufruct, not
only of real estate standing in both their names, but of that sole
seized by his wife, whether in fee simple, fee tail or for life. It
remains the law that, while coverture continues, the husband has the
control, use, rents, and profits of an estate by entirety.0
Subsequent to the decision in Morrill, the Michigan court has
uniformly held that the husband is entitled to the full use of and
all the income from property held by the entirety.81 Although, with
one possible exception, all of the cases to date have dealt with real
property,82 the same rule presumably would apply to personalty
under the rationale of DeYoung v. Meslers3 that a husband and
wife's joint ownership of certain classes of personalty should not be
treated differently from their ownership of realty.
Notwithstanding the uniformity of the Michigan decisions on
this question, the issue became confused in 1935 when the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Commissioner v. Hart that,
under Michigan law, the income from property held by the entirety
79. 174 Mich. 418, 140 N.W. 577 (1913).
80. Id. at 429-30, 140 N.W. at 581.
81. Way v. Root, 174 Mich. 418, 140 N.W. 577 (1913); In re Thomas Estate, 341
Mich. 158, 67 N.W.2d 85 (1954); Dombrowski v. Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W. 293
(1939).
82. The possible exception is Dombrowski v. Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W.
293 (1939), which involved, inter alia, the income from a grocery business conducted
on realty held by the entirety.
83. 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1964).
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was shared equally by the two spouses and therefore that each was
taxable on one-half of the income.84 The Sixth Circuit grounded its
decision on the erroneous conclusion that Michigan Supreme Court
decisions holding that the creditors of a husband could not garnish
the income from property held by the entirety constituted a repudia-
tion of the earlier Morrill decision that the husband was entitled to
all the income. The court apparently overlooked that the opinions
in both the Morrill decision and the decision in Way v. Root ex-
pressly stated that the creditors of the husband could not levy on
the income from property held by the entirety, and that this fact
was not inconsistent with the husband's right to the income. In any
event, subsequent to Hart, the Michigan Supreme Court has adhered
to its holding in Morrill. 5 Notwithstanding the patent error of the
Hart decision, the Tax Court has accepted its holding as a correct
statement of Michigan law,86 and the writer has been informed that
the Hart decision is followed by both the local Michigan office and
the national office of the Internal Revenue Service, who apply the
income and gift tax laws on the premise that the income from Mich-
igan property held by the entirety is to be divided equally between
the spouses. The position of the Internal Revenue Service presents
something of a dilemma to a taxpayer, since if he plans his affairs on
the assumption that the gift tax valuation of an interest in a Mich-
igan tenancy by the entirety must take into account the husband's
right to all the income, he is subject to the risk that the Service,
relying on Hart, will value the interests differently; and, on the
other hand, there is no assurance that the Service will perpetuate
the error of Hart indefinitely.
The question of the husband's right to all the income has been
further clouded by the Michigan Constitution of 1963. Section 1 of
article X of the 1963 Constitution is very similar to section 5 of
article XVI of the 1850 Constitution and section 8 of article XVI
of the 1908 Constitution, except for two sentences that were added
in the 1963 provision. One, which is relevant to the issue at hand,
reads: "The disabilities of coverture as to property are abolished."
The impact (if any) of this constitutional provision on the husband's
84. Commissioner v. Hart, 76 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1935). The allocation of income
between a husband and wife was a recurring income tax issue prior to the adoption
in 1948 of a split income provision for spouses.
85. In re Thomas Estate, 341 Mich. 158, 67 N.W.2d 85 (1954); Dombrowski v.
Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W. 293 (1939).
86. Oren C. White, 18 T.C. 385, 386 (1952).
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right to all of the income depends upon whether his right is a
product of the common-law view of marital unity, or whether it is
merely an attribute of a tenancy by entirety.
In Morrill,87 the Michigan Supreme Court considered this issue,
and expressly refrained from deciding which of the two possible
rationales was correct. While the court did not believe that it was
necessary to decide that issue in Morrill, it is difficult to see how it
could be avoided. If the husband's right to the income stemmed from
his common-law marital rights, which in turn were based on a wife's
disability to own separate property, then the husband's claim to
income would surely have been terminated by the adoption of the
Married Women's Act and by the 1850 and 1908 Constitutions. The
only reasonable defense to that contention is that the correct basis
for the husband's right to income is that it is an attribute of the
estate of entirety, rather than an attribute of coverture, and that the
aforementioned provisions had no effect on the estate. The New
York Court of Appeals recognized this question in its decision in
Hiles v. Fisher,s8 and resolved it by holding that the husband's
rights were an incident of his marital rights and therefore were
terminated. In Way v. Root,89 decided nine years after Morrill, the
Michigan Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged the need to re-
solve this issue and accordingly held that the husband's right to
income was an attribute of the estate of entirety.
Since, under the Michigan decisions, the husband's right is not
grounded on any marital disabilities of his wife, the 1963 Constitu-
tional provision expunging such disabilities is inapposite. 90
However, the resolution of the technical questions might be
quite different if it could be shown that one purpose in adding the
new sentence to the 1963 Constitution was to require that the
spouses share equally in the income. The official record of the
1961-1962 Constitutional Convention not only fails to support that
contention, but to the contrary strongly indicates that the delegates
believed that the added sentence did not effect any change in exist-
ing law. As initially proposed, the new sentence read "The dis-
abilities of coverture are abolished," but the delegates struck that
87. 138 Mich. 112, 101 N.W. 209 (1904).
88. 144 N.Y. 806, 39 N.E. 337 (1895).
89. 174 Mich. 418, 140 N.W. 577 (1913).
90. Even assuming arguendo that the 1963 constitution did terminate the husband's
right to all the income, the federal Constitution may well preclude any change in
the husband's rights in property acquired by the entirety prior to 1963. See note 94
infra.
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sentence from the proposed constitution because they were uncertain
of its meaning and fearful that it would change existing law.91 The
sentence was then revised to read in its present form (limited to
property) and re-offered as an amendment and adopted.92 In support
of that amendment, one of the proponents for adoption of the
sentence, Mr. Everett, stated that the disabilities of coverture had
been eliminated in modem times and that the proposed sentence
enunciated
as a principle that these common law disabilities may never again
arise in the state of Michigan, and we are affording those who have
some question about it the assurance that the legislature never can
take it away. . . . [The legislature] would never have the nerve
to take it away. But it doesn't change the fact that this is a historical
declaration of women's freedoms .... 93
There can be no policy justification for disabling a wife from
sharing in the income from property held by the entirety, but it
appears that the present law in Michigan does so. Hopefully, the
state legislature will soon change this anachronistic rule.94 Legisla-
tive action is particularly appropriate here since the 1963 Constitu-
tion has raised doubts as to the continuing vitality of the rule, and
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hart has caused considerable con-
fusion as to the gift tax valuation of interests in such estates.
The tax significance of the husband's right to all the income from
property held by the entirety extends also to the question whether
a gift to a woman of an interest in property as a tenant by the
entirety constitutes a gift of a future interest and therefore does not
qualify for the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion. As noted in the
discussion above of certain joint tenancy interests, the disability of
either spouse to terminate a tenancy by entirety without the other's
consent might cause a spouse's survivorship rights to be treated as a
future interest; consequently, albeit the government has not yet
91. 2 MIcHIGAN CONSTrrrTONAL CONVENTION 1961-1962 (Official Record) 3001-03.
92. Id. at 3149-51.
93. Id. at 3150.
94. The legislature clearly is empowered to change the rule for property acquired
by entirety after enactment of such a legislative change. However, in view of the
Michigan Supreme Court's determination that the husband's right to all the income
is a property right, there is a serious constitutional question as to whether the
legislature could deprive the husband of his right to all the income from property
acquired by the entirety prior to adoption of a legislative change. See Ford & Son v.
Little Falls Co., 280 US. 369 (1930); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); Muhlker v. New York & H.R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905). A termination of the
husband's right might constitute a taking of a property right without compensation
in contravention of the fourteenth amendment.
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asserted the position, a gift tax exclusion for gifts of such property
interests would be limited in amount to the value of the donee
spouse's right to the income from the property.95 Where a wife has
no right to income from property held by the entirety, she has no
immediate right to the use, possession, or enjoyment of the property,
and her entire property interest is thus a future one. Consequently,
if the husband is entitled to all of the income from property held by
the entirety under Michigan law, there is no justification for per-
mitting any gift tax exclusion for gifts to a woman of property held
by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety. 6 Unless the
status of the husband's rights are clarified, a donor will have to
assume the risk that his claim for an exclusion for such gifts will
be contested.97
95. See text accompanying notes 55-40 supra.
96. If the donor of the gift to the wife is her husband, he will be allowed a marital
deduction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2523(d).
97. The failure of the Internal Revenue Service to deny exclusions for such tenan-
cies is not fully explained by the Service's misinterpretation of Michigan law, since
the Service apparently has not denied the exclusion either in Massachusetts or North
Carolina, where the husband is also entitled to all the income from property held by
the entirety.
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